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In March 2010, a New York federal district court granted summary 
judgment invalidating a number of biotechnology patents directed to the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 human breast cancer genes.1 One of the most highly 
publicized patent disputes in recent memory, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology (AMP) v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
and Myriad Genetics, Inc. (hereinafter Myriad)2 pits patient care advocates 
against the patent-owning biotechnology industry.3 The Myriad decision is 
now under review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which will likely reverse the district court and confirm the patent-eligibility 
of the claimed isolated genes.4  
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 1. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (as amended Apr. 5, 2010) (“[T]he 
challenged patent claims are directed to (1) isolated DNA containing all or portions of the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 gene sequence and (2) methods for ‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ BRCA1 [sic] and 
BRCA2 gene sequences to identify the presence of mutations correlating with a predisposition to 
breast or ovarian cancer.”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Timothy Caulfield, Human Gene Patents: Proof or Problems?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
133, 139–40 (2009) (discussing “social trade-off inherent in the patent system” in the 
biotechnology context and public concern over patient access to clinically useful technologies). 
 4. The Federal Circuit has previously upheld the validity of gene patents.  See, e.g., In re 
Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See also In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  These decisions applied 
qualitative patentability criteria such as nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and disclosure 
compliance under 35 U.S.C. § 112. However, the Federal Circuit has not previously confronted a 
Myriad-type challenge to the patent-eligibility of gene patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, most likely 
because § 101 qualification was taken as a given by the parties and not raised as an issue on 
appeal in the court’s earlier cases.    
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Neither the Federal Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court should prohibit 
the patenting of genetic material through judicial decision;5 such a drastic 
change in patent law requires due deliberation by Congress.6 Despite the 
critical importance to society of facilitating patient access to genetic testing, 
dismantling patent protection for this important technology is not the right 
approach; instead, modifying approaches to licensing gene patents is.7 
Since the 1980s, the USPTO has granted more than 20,000 patents 
claiming isolated DNA molecules, almost 4,000 of which claim isolated 
human DNA encoding proteins.8 Based on the likelihood that the USPTO 
will continue its past practice of granting such patents, a Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Advisory Committee extensively 
studied patient access concerns stemming from restrictive licensing of some 
gene patents.9 Rather than eliminating the grant of such patents, the 
Committee has proposed that patient access be facilitated through statutory 
exemptions from patent infringement liability.10 Specifically, the proposed 
exemptions would allow unlicensed use of gene patents for research and 
diagnostic, but not therapeutic, purposes.11  
 
 5. See infra Part I.  
 6. See infra Part I.   
 7. See infra Part II.   
 8. See Remarks of David Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property 
and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, BIO International Convention 
(May 3–6, 2010),  available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/05/04/kappos-talks-patent-
reform-and-gene-patents-at-bio-convention/id=10382/ (May 4, 2010). See also Statement of Q. 
Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property & Director of the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (July 13, 2000), at 3: 
Over the past twenty years, many patent applications have been filed that are drawn to 
subject matter relating to genes.  The filing rate of applications relating to genes has 
dramatically increased in the past few years.  Currently, over 20,000 applications 
relating to genes are pending before the USPTO.  Since the first gene related 
applications were filed, approximately 6,000 patents have issued which are drawn to 
full-length genes from human, animal, plant, bacterial and viral sources.  Of these 6,000 
patents, over 1,000 are specifically drawn to human genes and human gene variations 
that distinguish individuals. 
 9. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS Report], available at 
http://oba.od nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf. 
 10. SACGHS Report, supra note 9, at 94. 
 11. See id. at 97.  The Committee calls the proposed exemption from infringement liability for 
gene-based diagnostic testing a “narrowly tailored exemption [permitting] the holders of patents 
on genes to continue to enforce their exclusive rights to therapeutic uses of the claimed molecules, 
thereby preserving the incentive such patents create for the development of therapeutics” and 
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I support the Committee’s proposed scheme, but suggest that it be 
modified to provide remuneration to the patent owner in the case of 
diagnostic use. In Part I of this essay, I explore the district court’s decision 
in Myriad and conclude that it should not stand.12 In Part II, I describe the 
HHS Advisory Committee’s recommendations for facilitating access to 
patented genetic testing and offer a modification of the Committee’s 
proposed framework.13 
I. The District Court’s Summary Judgment Opinion in Myriad 
The patents challenged by AMP, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), and other plaintiffs claimed both breast cancer gene-related 
products and processes.14 The March 29, 2010 decision of the Southern 
District of New York, authored by Judge Robert W. Sweet, invalidated both 
types of claims.15 This essay focuses exclusively on the debate concerning 
the patent-eligibility of the product (i.e., composition of matter) claims, 
setting aside the question of the process claims’ patent-eligibility under the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos.16  
Judge Sweet’s discussion of the product claims in Myriad began in a 
promising vein, citing Judge Giles Rich’s classic guidance in In re Bergy17 
 
asserts that the proposed exemption for research on or with genes “is designed to permit research 
that can generate insights into disease, genetic tests, and therapeutics.”  Id. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he sole task of this Court is to resolve 
whether the claimed compositions and methods constitute statutory subject matter or fall within 
the judicially created products of nature exception to patentable subject matter.”). 
 15. Id. at 232 (holding composition claims invalid); id. at 237 (holding method claims 
invalid). 
 16. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).  The Court in Bilski held that patent 
application claims to a method of fixing commodity costs by hedging weather and market risks 
were not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claims were drawn to an 
“abstract idea.”   The facts of Bilski did not involve composition of matter (or other product) 
claims, and it would Seem illogical to characterize a tangible, isolated DNA sequence as an 
abstract idea.    
  Nevertheless, one judge of the Federal Circuit has raised Bilski's potential applicability to 
the Myriad dispute by writing that “[j]ust as the patentability of abstract ideas would preempt 
others from using ideas that are in the public domain . . ., so too would allowing the patenting of 
naturally occurring substances preempt the use by others of substances that should be freely 
available to the public.”  Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., No. 2009-1568, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
4, 2010) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 17. 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (describing “three doors” to obtaining a patent); id. at 
960–61 (stating that “the questions of whether a particular invention is novel or useful are 
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that 35 U.S.C. § 101 statutory (i.e., patent-eligible) subject matter issues 
must be distinguished from § 102 (novelty) and § 103 (nonobviousness) 
issues.18 But the district court took a wrong turn when it interpreted Bergy’s 
guidance to distinguish away the leading purified products of nature 
decision, Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,19 as involving merely 
novelty rather than statutory subject matter issues.20  
 
questions wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject 
matter”). 
 18. Id. at 960 (discussing the need for “separate keys to open in succession the three doors of 
sections 101, 102 and 103”).   All statutory references herein are to sections of the U.S. Patent 
Act, 35 U.S.C. (2010). 
 19. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).  Judge 
Sweet’s Myriad opinion recalls his own appearance as a government lawyer before Judge Hand.  
Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 225 n.46 (stating that “[a]lthough Judge Hand once turned his back on 
the author of this opinion arguing before him on behalf of the Government, his opinion in Parke-
Davis deserves careful review but brings to mind that oft repeated adage ‘Quote Learned, but 
follow Gus’”) (citing James Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second 
Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 389 n.17 (1995)). 
 20. Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis considered whether the claimed 
composition (isolated adrenalin) was a patentable “composition of matter,” stating: 
Nor is the patent only for a degree of purity, and therefore not for a new “composition 
of matter.” As I have already shown, it does not include a salt, and no one had ever 
isolated a substance which was not in salt form, and which was anything like 
Takamine’s. Indeed, Sadtler supposes it to exist as a natural salt, and that the base was 
an original production of Takamine’s. That was a distinction not in degree, but in kind. 
But, even if it were merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that 
such products are not patentable. Takamine was the first to make it available for any 
use by removing it from the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of 
course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every 
practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. That was a good 
ground for a patent. 
Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.  See also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 
160–62 (4th Cir. 1958) (sustaining § 101 validity of composition claims to “[vitamin] B(12)-
active compositions derived from . . . specified fermentates” against challenge that claims recited 
unpatentable “products of nature,” and citing Parke-Davis as illustrating principle that “where the 
requirements of the [Patent] Act [(i.e., novelty, utility, and nonobviousness)] are met, patents upon 
products of nature are granted and their validity sustained”). 
  Judge Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis is recognized as the foundational case for the 
patent-eligibility of purified and isolated products of nature, which differ from their corresponding 
natural products “not merely in degree of purity, but in degree of kind.”  Lauren Nowierski, A 
Defense of Patenting Human Gene Sequences Under U.S. Law: Support for the Patenting of 
Isolated and Purified Substances, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 473, 483 (2008) (analyzing 
Parke-Davis and observing that “[t]he jurisprudence that developed following Parke-Davis 
primarily relied on Judge Hand’s decision to support the patentability of extracted, isolated, and 
purified ‘products of nature’ that meet the other statutory requirements of patentability”). See also 
1-1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[9] (2010) (commenting that “there is a long 
line of cases that hold that mere purification of known materials does not result in a patentable 
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The district court’s opinion went further astray by placing unjustified 
reliance on two inapposite Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s/1940s, 
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.21 and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co.22 Both of these decisions are off point, for they dealt 
with novelty or nonobviousness (earlier expressed as an elusive requirement 
for “invention”) rather than patentable subject matter issues.23 American 
Fruit Growers inexplicably relied on 19th century tariff cases to decide what 
is a patentable “manufacture” under the Patent Act.24  
Turning to more pertinent Supreme Court precedent from 1980, 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,25 the Myriad district court extracted a single 
phrase: that the bacteria genetically engineered by Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty 
possessed “markedly different characteristics” than those found in nature.26 
Judge Sweet elevated that three-word description to the test for qualifying 
 
product,” but citing Parke-Davis as recognizing an exception to the purity rule when “the new 
pure compound differs ‘in kind’ rather than merely ‘in degree’ from the old compound”). 
 21. 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (invalidating patent claiming fresh fruit having rind impregnated 
with borax to provide mold resistance on ground was not a patentable “article of manufacture”).  
The American Fruit Growers Court asserted, without citation to authority, that 
 [a]ddition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material 
an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property.  The 
added substance only protects the natural article against deterioration by inhibiting 
development of extraneous spores upon the rind.  There is no change in the name, 
appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the 
same beneficial uses as theretofore.”  Id. at 11–12.  Scholars have observed that “[t]he 
presence or absence of a ‘new or distinctive form, quality or property’ is an issue 
properly relevant to the statutory standards of novelty and nonobviousness. 
See CHISUM, supra note 20, at § 1.02[3][a]. 
 22. 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (invalidating patent claiming mixture of mutually non-inhibitive 
strains of bacteria that advantageously helped various legume plants extract nitrogen on ground of 
invention or discovery).  The Funk Bros. Court opined that “[e]ven though [the claimed 
discovery] may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the product of invention.”  Id.  
The Funk Bros. decision is “perhaps best viewed as an interpretation of the nonobviousness or 
‘invention’ requirement.”  See CHISUM, supra note 20, at § 1.02[7][b]. 
 23. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing novelty, nonobviousness and 
requirements for “invention” under the Patent Act). 
 24. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc., 283 U.S. at 12 (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 
613, 615 (1887)) (finding that there was no patentable “manufacture” of shells on grounds that 
there was no transformation “into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character, 
or use from that of a shell”). 
 25. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 26. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(as amended Apr. 5, 2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310) (contrasting the bacterium at 
issue with the bacterial mixture at issue in Funk Bros., stating “the patentee has produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the 
potential for significant utility.  His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own . . . .”). 
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an isolated genetic product under § 101, stating that “[t]he question thus 
presented by Plaintiffs’ challenge to the composition claims is whether the 
isolated DNA claimed by Myriad possesses ‘markedly different 
characteristics’ from a product of nature.”27 Judge Sweet found that it did 
not.28 
The Myriad district court’s opinion misinterpreted Chakrabarty.29 The 
primary focus of Chakrabarty was not on the degree of difference between 
Chakrabarty’s genetically engineered bacterium and bacillus bacteria as 
they existed in nature.30 Rather, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
latter were nature’s handiwork, while the former would not have existed but 
for Chakrabarty’s intervention and ingenuity in manipulating the DNA.31 
Accordingly, the § 101 analysis for gene patents should focus on who or 
what (i.e., whether human or nature) produced the claimed subject matter.32 
The “degree of difference” question speaks to novelty under § 102 and/or 
nonobviousness under § 103.  
Myriad filed its notice of appeal in the Federal Circuit in June 2010,33 
but the gene patenting controversy crystallized by the Myriad litigation 
 
 27. Id. at 227–28. 
 28. Id. at 229. 
In light of DNA’s unique qualities as a physical embodiment of information, none of 
the structural and functional differences cited by Myriad between native BRCA1/2 
DNA and the isolated BRCA1/2 DNA claimed in the patents-in-suit render the claimed 
DNA ‘markedly different.’ This conclusion is driven by the overriding importance of 
DNA’s nucleotide sequence to both its natural biological function as well as the utility 
associated with DNA in its isolated form. The preservation of this defining 
characteristic of DNA in its native and isolated forms mandates the conclusion that the 
challenged composition claims are directed to unpatentable products of nature.  
Id. 
 29. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10 (comparing genetically engineered bacterium to 
bacteria that existed in nature and holding the former patentable subject matter as “a product of 
human ingenuity”). 
 31. Id.  
[Chakrabarty’s] claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a 
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of 
human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use. . . . 
[Chakrabarty] has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility.  His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; 
accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.  
Id. 
 32. See generally U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 33. Myriad Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 
S.D.N.Y. (June 16, 2010) (No. 4515). 
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could well continue beyond the Federal Circuit’s review.34 Judge Sweet 
invited Supreme Court interest by quoting Justice Breyer’s dissent from the 
dismissal of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc.,35 that “sometimes too much patent protection can 
impede, rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts . . . .’”36 Because the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski was 
limited on its facts to the patentability of process or method claims under § 
101 and did not (at least directly) address the patentability of composition 
of matter claims,37 the legitimacy of patenting so-called purified products 
of nature (such as isolated and purified genetic material) remains an issue 
ripe for Supreme Court adjudication.38  
If the Court granted certiorari in Myriad, the Justices would 
undoubtedly consider carefully the guidance of their expansive 1980 
decision in Chakrabarty, which held that genetic material removed from its 
native state (in that case, in the form of a genetically modified bacterium) 
was statutory subject matter under § 101.39 The Court’s more recent 
holding in J.E.M. Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. 
would also be relevant.40 The Court in J.E.M. held that plants are 
 
 34. See John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer Genes Cannot be Patented, U.S. Judge 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at B0 (stating that Myriad could have far-reaching implications 
impacting the future of medicine). See also Marisa Noelle Pins, Impeding Access to Quality 
Patient Care and Patient Rights: How Myriad Genetics’ Gene Patents are Unknowingly Killing 
Cancer Patients and How to Calm the Ripple Effect, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 377, 396 (2010) 
(“Several lawyers expect the ruling to be overturned, or at the very least ‘an important Supreme 
Court showdown’ to ensure [sic].”). 
 35. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari). 
 36. Id. at 126 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 37. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“The present case involves an invention 
that is claimed to be a ‘process’ under § 101.”); Id. at 3221 (“The machine-or-transformation test . 
. . is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”); Id. at 3222 
(rejecting Bilski’s patent application under Court’s precedents on the unpatentability of “abstract 
ideas” and declining to further define “what constitutes a patentable ‘process’”). 
 38. Cf. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., No. 2009-1568, slip op. at 3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2010) 
(Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has 
directly decided the issue of the patentability of isolated DNA molecules.  Although we have 
upheld the validity of several gene patents . . . none of our cases directly addresses the question of 
whether such patents encompass patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Although the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office . . . believes that at least some of these patents satisfy section 
101 . . . thus far the question has evaded judicial review.”). 
 39. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that respondent’s 
genetically modified bacterium qualified as patentable subject matter). 
 40. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
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potentially protectable under § 101 utility patents,41 despite the fact that 
alternative forms of protection are also available under the plant-specific 
statutes (i.e., the Plant Patent Act of 193042 and the Plant Variety Protection 
Act of 1970).43 Notably, the J.E.M. Court relied on Chakrabarty in 
“declin[ing] to narrow the reach of § 101 where Congress has given us no 
indication that it intends this result,”44 and described § 101 as “a dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.”45  
If it were to consider Myriad, the Supreme Court would also need to 
weigh the significant reliance interests of gene patent owners.46 Such 
interests are far more vested than those of business method patent holders. 
The USPTO has issued thousands of patents on isolated genetic material 
since the 1980s,47 pre-dating any significant trend toward patenting 
business methods.48 The agency’s position is that isolated and purified 
genetic sequences are potentially patentable.49 More than thirty years after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the U.S. Congress has not 
acted to legislatively overrule the Court’s holding that genetically 
engineered life forms are patent-eligible under § 101.50 In the meantime, 
 
 41. Id. at 127. 
 42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2006). 
 43. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2582 (2006). 
 44. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 145–46. 
 45. Id. at 135. 
 46. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y 2010) 
(noting that the case’s resolution “deeply concern[s],” inter alia, patent holders). See also Roger 
D. Klein, & Maurice J. Mahoney, Labcorp v. Metabolite Laboratories: The Supreme Court 
Listens, but Declines to Speak, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 147 (2008) (noting Myriad has placed 
great reliance on gene-related patent protection). 
 47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 48. The Federal Circuit’s 1998 State Street Bank case is generally considered to be the 
decision that opened the door to the filing of large numbers of business method patent applications 
in the USPTO.  State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 49. USPTO, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“[A]n 
inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated 
from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other 
molecules naturally associated with it.”). 
 50. See Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in 
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 477 (2003) (noting that Congress has not overruled 
Chakrabarty’s holding). 
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the U.S. biotech industry has become the world’s leader; the availability of 
patent protection has undoubtedly contributed to this success.51  
The § 101 statutory subject matter inquiry should not be used as a 
blunt instrument to cabin patenting of isolated genetic material.52 Other 
provisions of the Patent Act, as interpreted in recent Supreme Court and 
Federal Circuit decisions, already act as difficult (if not insurmountable) 
qualitative obstacles to obtaining patents on isolated genetic material.53 For 
example, the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex54 is widely 
viewed as having raised the bar for satisfying the § 103 requirement of 
nonobviousness across all technologies.55 Interpreting KSR in the genetic 
context, the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision in In re Kubin56 signaled that 
“classical” biotechnology inventions (i.e., claims to isolated genes that 
encode particular proteins) may now be routinely characterized as “obvious 
to try” in the KSR sense, and hence obvious under § 103.57 
 
 51. See Lila Fei, The Role of the Private Sector in Biotechnology: Research and 
Development, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 357, 363–64 (2002) (noting that patent protection is critical for 
the biotech industry’s large profits). 
 52. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (refusing to 
consider excluding isolated genetic material from patentability). See also Julian David Forman, 
Case Comment, A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology Patent 
Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 659 (2002) (noting that “[s]ubject matter does not 
Seem like a particularly useful doctrinal tool for evaluating biotechnology patents”). 
 53. See, e.g., KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (forbidding 
patenting when the claimed invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (recognizing significant “obviousness” 
hurdle for gene patents); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that a 
patentable invention must meet a standard of substantial utility). 
 54. KSR, 550 U.S. at 398. 
 55. See R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets v. Patents: The New Calculus, 2 No. 6 LANDSLIDE 
10, 2 (2010) (noting that KSR decision is illustrative of trend towards more restrictions on 
patents); Rubin L. McGrath et. al, Recent Developments in Patent Law and its Impact on Patent 
Litigation, 948 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 95, 112 (2008) (“[O]bviousness standards that have been 
distilled from KSR appear to have given patent challengers a diverse arsenal from which to attack 
patents.”). See generally Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals, Combinations, and “Common Sense”: 
How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision is Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness 
Determinations in Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 281, 281 (2008) 
(examining KSR’s substantial impact on an already complicated § 103 nonobviousness analysis). 
 56. 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 57. See id. (affirming USPTO Board’s conclusion that claimed genus of isolated nucleic acid 
molecules encoding Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing Ligand (NAIL) protein would have 
been obvious in view of prior art teachings of the NAIL protein and a detailed methodology for 
cloning genes, with motivation to isolate the claimed NAIL cDNA arising from the importance of 
NAIL’s role in human immune response). 
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,58 confirmed that satisfying the 
written description of the invention requirement under § 112, ¶ 1 is 
particularly onerous for biotechnological genus claims where few species 
have been actually reduced to practice. This results regardless of whether a 
person having ordinary skill in the art (the “PHOSITA”) would have been 
enabled to make and use the entirety of the genus.59 Ariad also enshrined as 
en banc law that the written description requirement applies to all claims, 
including originally-filed claims, and not merely those added or amended 
after filing,60 contrary to earlier understandings of the requirement as 
limited to priority policing.61  
The utility requirement of § 101 is yet another qualitative hurdle to 
patenting gene-based inventions.62 The Federal Circuit held in In re 
Fisher63 that a claimed genetic sequence, part of a larger underlying gene 
for which no overall structure or function had been established as of the 
patent’s filing date, did not satisfy the utility requirement of § 101.64  
The cumulative impact of decisions such as KSR, Kubin, Ariad, and 
Fisher means that gene patents are increasingly difficult to obtain.65 Those 
patents already in force may now be at heightened risk of invalidation under 
 
 58. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 59. Id. at 1345 (stating that “a separate requirement to describe one’s invention is basic to 
patent law . . . . The specification must . . . describe how to make and use the invention (i.e., 
enable it), but that is a different task”). 
 60. Id. at 1351 (stating that “[n]either the statute nor legal precedent limits the written 
description requirement to cases of priority or distinguishes between original and amended 
claims”). 
 61. Cf. Id. at 1350 (disagreeing with Ariad Pharmaceutical’s contention that court’s decision 
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), “constituted a 
change in the law, imposing new requirements on biotechnology inventions”). See also Janice M. 
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological 
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY  TECH. L.J. 615, 615 (1998) (asserting that “[t]he [Regents v. Eli] Lilly 
decision may profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene inventions . . . [and] 
represents the latest advance in an ominous trend towards imposition of uniquely heightened 
patentability requirements for biotechnological inventions.”). 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  See also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 
1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (noting that § 101 requires patent application to disclose the invention’s 
utility); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n application must disclose a use 
which is not so vague as to be meaningless.”). 
 63. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 64. See id. at 1373, 1379. 
 65. See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); Ariad Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 
1351, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379. 
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these new rules.66 The inherent ambiguity of § 101’s broadly-phrased 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter need not be invoked when 
qualitative doctrines such as nonobviousness, utility, and the disclosure 
requirements have been much further developed and more finely tuned to 
deal with gene-based inventions.67 
II. Providing Enhanced Patient Access to Genetic Diagnostic Testing 
Without Eliminating Patent Rights 
Public concern should be redirected from the granting of gene patents 
themselves, which will likely continue despite Judge Sweet’s decision, to 
greater focus on the restrictive licensing practices applied to some of these 
patents. Myriad illustrates such practices.68 
Defendant Myriad is the sole U.S. source of full BRAC testing,69 for 
which the company reportedly charges about $3,200.70 Myriad, a for-profit 
corporation, derives 80% of its revenues from its proprietary 
BRACAnalysis® testing, which it characterizes as “the standard of care in 
identification of individuals with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.”71 
Not all insurance plans are accepted.72 Importantly, there is no place for a 
patient to get a second opinion on the genetic testing; no sharing of samples 
 
 66. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406 (forbidding patenting when the claimed invention would have 
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (requiring 
adequate written description); Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1360 (recognizing significant “obviousness” 
hurdle for gene patents); Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373 (stating that claimed genetic sequences must 
provide specific, immediate, “real world” benefits). 
 67. Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1087, 1091–92 (2007) (noting that nonobviousness, utility, and adequate description are more 
practical avenues than § 101 for analyzing patentability of software-related inventions). 
 68. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y 2010) 
(providing example of restrictive licensing of BRCA1/2 gene testing technology). 
 69. See id. at 189 (stating that “Myriad is . . . the current exclusive licensee of the patents-in-
suit [and] is the sole provider of full sequencing of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in the United States 
on a commercial basis”) (citing Myriad Answer ¶ 28). 
 70. Sixty Minutes: Patented Genes (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 4, 2010), http:// 
www.cbs.com/primetime/60_minutes/video/?pid=DzbFbHN8QAJrs44sVo6h4pHFfblUQfpD. 
 71. Marketed Products, MYRIAD GENETICS, INC. (2009), http://www myriad.com/products/ 
(describing BRACAnalysis®). 
 72. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 204 (stating that “[c]urrently, 90% of 
the tests Myriad performs are covered by insurance at over 90% of the test cost”) (citing 
Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 32, 33, 52, 53). See also Complaint at 10, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad, 2009 WL 1343027, May 12, 2009 [hereinafter Complaint] (asserting at paragraph 21 that 
Myriad will not accept insurance coverage from MassHealth, “a Medicaid insurance program for 
low-income people”). 
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is permitted to ensure quality of testing.73 Women with the BRCA1/2 
mutation may be making life-altering decisions about whether to have 
prophylactic mastectomies or hysterectomies without the back stop of a 
second test run by an entity other than Myriad.74 This state of affairs, as 
alleged in the ACLU’s complaint, is simply not acceptable.75 However, 
placing all the blame on the granting of gene patents is not acceptable, 
either. 
Although District Judge Sweet has ruled (and many have argued) that 
the U.S. government should completely prohibit the patenting of isolated 
genes,76 there are compelling reasons to reject this extreme approach.77 
Rather than prohibit gene patenting, an alternative strategy aimed at the 
problem of patient access to patented genetic testing resources would place 
carefully drawn limits on a patentee’s ability to enforce its exclusivity in 
certain circumstances.78 This alternative strategy would involve either an 
outright exemption from liability for patent infringement, or at least some 
form of mandatory nonexclusive licensing with remuneration to the 
patentee.79  
Many scholars have advocated a statutory exemption in U.S. patent 
law from infringement liability when researchers use patented materials for 
non-commercial purposes such as research and experimentation—a sort of 
 
 73. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d.  at 207 (citations to declarations omitted) 
(stating that “[p]laintiffs contend that as a result of the patents-in-suit, BRCA1/2 genetic testing is 
one of the very few tests performed as part of breast cancer care and prevention for which a doctor 
or patient cannot get a second confirmatory test done through another laboratory. . . . In particular, 
women who receive a positive result cannot confirm the lab’s findings or Seek a second opinion 
on the interpretation of those results”); Complaint, supra note 72, at 27 (asserting at paragraph 90 
that “[b]ecause of its patents on the BRCA genes, Myriad has the power to bar patients from 
obtaining testing other than through its laboratory. There are women . . . who have obtained full 
sequencing from Myriad, who cannot obtain a second opinion on their BRCA testing and are 
compelled to make major medical decisions based on a test that they cannot confirm.”). 
 74. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 207; Complaint, supra note 72, at 27. 
 75. See Complaint, supra note 72, at 27 (asserting that women are forced into making major 
medical decisions without being able to seek a second opinion). 
 76. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 237 (concluding that “the patents 
issued by the USPTO are directed to a law of nature and were therefore improperly granted”).  See 
also Allen K. Yu, Why it Might be Time to Eliminate Genomic Patents, Together With the Natural 
Extracts Doctrine Supporting Such Patents, 47 IDEA 659, 666–73 (2007) (examining the multiple 
arguments against the patenting of isolated genes). 
 77. See supra Part I. 
 78. See supra Part II. 
 79. See supra Part II. 
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“fair use” doctrine for patent law.80 Most other countries around the world 
(including most industrialized countries and the world’s leading patent 
systems—Germany, Japan, and the U.K.) have long included a research use 
exemption in their domestic patent laws.81 These patent systems have not 
fallen apart because of the exemption, nor has innovation in these countries 
stopped.82  
A standard objection to any proposed type of liability exemption is 
that it would lessen the economic value of patents by reducing their 
exclusionary power.83 This in turn would reduce the incentives to invent 
that patent protection offers.84 The economic objection should not lightly be 
brushed aside. Any proposal to alter the patent law liability framework has 
to be carefully thought out and narrowly defined.85 Vested property rights 
and expectations are at stake.86 So as not to unduly disrupt those reliance 
 
 80. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights 
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent 
Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for 
University and Non-Profit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Maureen 
A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); 
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004). 
 81. For example, Germany’s patent law provides that “[t]he effects of a patent shall not 
extend to . . . acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented 
invention.”  German Patent Act § 11.2 (1980), amended by the Laws of July 16 and August 6, 
1998, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/de/de081en html.  Japan’s statutes 
provide that “[t]he effects of a patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent right for 
the purposes of experiment or research.”  Japan Patent Law § 69(1), Law No. 121 of 1959, 
amended by Law No. 220 of 1999, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_ 
new/en/jp/jp036en html.  The United Kingdom (U.K.) patent law provides that “[a]n act which, 
apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall not 
do so if—(a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial; [or] (b) it is done for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention.”  Patents Act, c. 37, § 60(5) 
(1977) (Eng.), available at http:// www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/gb/gb001en html. 
 82. See Kimberly M. Thomas, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a 
Compulsory Licensing Provision in Wake of an Absent Experimental Use Exception, 7 LOY. L. & 
TECH. ANN. 97, 108, 111–16 (2007) (observing the patent systems of foreign countries that 
employ statutory exemptions). 
 83. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 
631–32 (Spring 2009); Jordan P. Karp, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The 
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2180 (1991). 
 84. See Karp, supra note 83 (“[A] broad experimental use exception, by discouraging 
inventors from relying on the patent system, would . . . reduce innovative activity in those 
industries that rely on patent protection.”). 
 85. Mueller, supra note 80, at 919.   
 86. Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 284 (2008). 
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interests, legislators should consider implementing any liability exemption 
(or compulsory licensing scheme) in a prospective-only manner.87 
Although a prospective implementation would not necessarily address the 
immediate problem of access to the patented BRCA1/2 genes, a prospective 
change in the law would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s caution 
against unfairly discounting the expectations of patent owners who obtained 
their patents under a different set of rules.88  
An Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society (hereinafter 
“SACHGS”) provides guidance to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius on a 
“broad range of policy issues raised by the development and use of genetic 
technologies [including] the impact of gene patents and licensing practices 
on access to genetic testing.”89 The 18-person committee includes a cross-
section of notable experts from public sector health departments, private 
sector genetics companies, health care foundations, academia (medical and 
legal),90 and attorneys in private practice.91 In April 2010, the SACGHS 
issued its final report concerning gene patents and licensing practices and 
their impact on patient access to genetic tests.92 Committee members 
compiled numerous case studies (including the Myriad dispute), consulted 
with experts, and surveyed the literature on gene patenting.93  
 
 87. See generally Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of 
Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1301 (2001) (recognizing the importance of advance notice 
in the context of compulsory licensing). 
 88. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 739 
(2002) (stating that fundamental alterations in rules risk the legitimate expectations inventors hold 
in their property); Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 
(1997) (stating that changing the rules would “subvert the various balances the PTO sought to 
strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected 
by our decision”); id. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (warning that a new presumption might 
“unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of patent 
prosecution that such a presumption would apply”). 
 89. SACGHS Report, supra note 9. 
 90. Leading patent law scholar Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss of NYU Law is a SACGHS 
member.  Id. at i. 
 91. Id. at ii. 
 92. See SACGHS Report, supra note 9.  An earlier draft was published in February 2010.  See 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., REVISED DRAFT REPORT ON GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/SACGHS%20Patents%20Report%20Approved%202-5-
20010.pdf. 
 93. See SACGHS Report, supra note 9 (stating the Committee’s report is “based on evidence 
gathered through a literature review and original case studies of genetic testing for 10 clinical 
conditions as well as consultations with experts and a consideration of public perspectives”).  The 
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The SACGHS report makes a number of important recommendations, 
but notably does not recommend that gene patents be eliminated.94 Rather, 
the Committee recommends that the U.S. patent statutes be amended to 
create certain limited exemptions from liability for infringing gene patent 
claims.95 The proposed exemptions would apply in two situations: (1) 
making, using, or selling a test developed under a gene patent for “patient-
care purposes”;96 and (2) using patented genes in the pursuit of research.97 
The Committee believes its recommendation for statutory exemption from 
liability is “the most expeditious and straightforward way of addressing the 
identified problems and promoting patient access to emerging genetic 
advances.”98 
The SACGHS report describes the Committee’s first proposed liability 
exemption, which would apply when patented genetic tests are offered for 
“patient-care” (i.e., diagnostic) purposes, as a “narrowly tailored” activity.99 
In contrast, “therapeutic uses” of patented genes (e.g., gene transfer to treat 
a genetic disease or disorder) would not be exempted or shielded.100 
 
case studies were prepared by the Duke University Center for Genome Ethics, Law & Policy. Id. 
at A-1–51.   
 94. See id. at 97–100 (detailing Recommendations 1–6); id. at 11 (explaining that report does 
not explore questions about the legitimacy of granting patents on human genes or the morality of 
doing so . . . ”).  While not calling for any broad elimination of gene patents, the Committee does, 
however,  
  urge[] the Secretary to use current authority to discourage the seeking, the granting,  
  and the invoking of any patents on simple associations between a genotype and  
  a phenotype,” because such association patent claims “threaten the availability of  
  existing genetic tests and are an anticipated barrier to the development of testing  
  innovations, such as microarrays and whole-genome sequencing.  
Id. at 97. 
 95. Id.  (“Recommendation 1: Support the Creation of Exemptions from Infringement 
Liability”). 
 96. Id. (proposing in Recommendation 1(A) “[t]he creation of an exemption from liability for 
infringement of patent claims on genes for anyone making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or 
selling a test developed under the patent for patient-care purposes.”). 
 97. Id. (proposing in Recommendation 1(B) “[t]he creation of an exemption from patent 
infringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.”). 
 98. Id.   
 99. Id.   
 100. Id. (“This narrowly tailored exemption [allowing service providers to offer gene-based 
diagnostic testing for patient-care purposes] permits the holders of patents on genes to continue to 
enforce their exclusive rights to therapeutic uses of the claimed molecules, thereby preserving the 
incentive such patents create for the development of therapeutics.  Moreover, by preserving the 
right to patent genes and enforce those patents for therapeutic applications, this exemption 
maintains the strong incentive patents create for privately funded basic genetic research, which is 
often ultimately driven by the hope of developing a therapeutic.”). 
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However, the protected (i.e., non-infringing) activity would include making, 
using, selling, or offering for sale, a test developed under a gene patent.101  
This first proposed recommendation appears to contemplate complete 
exemption from liability, meaning that there would be no act of 
infringement and no remuneration due to the patentee, analogous to the 
operation of fair use in copyright law.102 The proposed liability exemption 
would apply to both non-commercial and commercial laboratories.103 The 
committee does not consider remuneration for patient-care purposes to be 
necessary, because the continued enforceability of gene patents against 
therapeutic uses would be sufficient to preserve incentives for the 
development of gene based therapeutics.104  
It is difficult to know, ex ante, whether the Committee’s prediction is 
correct. If commercial genetic testing laboratories are earning profits 
through the sale of testing services that involve making and/or using 
patented genes, I contend that some reasonable royalty based on those 
profit-generating sales ought to flow back to the patentee. The royalty must 
be set ex ante at a reasonable level so as to protect patients from excessively 
high pricing by the laboratories. 
One way to structure this remuneration would be to implement a 
mandatory licensing scheme for gene patents.105 The notion of mandatory, 
government-compelled, or “compulsory” licensing of patents has long been 
anathema in the U.S., but many other industrialized countries (not only 
developing countries such as India, Thailand, and Brazil) include 
compulsory licensing provisions in their domestic patent statutes.106 The 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (stating that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an 
infringement of copyright”); SACGHS Report, supra note 9, at 97 (proposing “an exemption from 
patent infringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research”). 
 103. SACGHS Report, supra note 9, at 97. 
 104. Id.  (stating that “[t]his narrowly tailored exemption [allowing service providers to offer 
gene-based diagnostic testing for patient-care purposes] permits the holders of patents on genes to 
continue to enforce their exclusive rights to therapeutic uses of the claimed molecules, thereby 
preserving the incentive such patents create for the development of therapeutics.  Moreover, by 
preserving the right to patent genes and enforce those patents for therapeutic applications, this 
exemption maintains the strong incentive patents create for privately funded basic genetic 
research, which is often ultimately driven by the hope of developing a therapeutic”)  
 105. See Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny 
and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403, 412 (2005). 
 106. See, e.g., German Patent Law Act §§ 81–85 (1980), amended by the laws of July 16 and 
August 6, 1998 (providing for compulsory license proceedings), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text_pdf.jsp?lang=EN&id=1035 (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). See also 
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Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement permit this.107 In practice, 
compulsory licensing provisions are very rarely invoked.108 Rather, 
voluntary negotiation over patent licenses proceeds in the shadow of the 
statutory compulsory licensing provisions.109 The threat of compulsory 
licensing encourages patentees to license more widely and on more 
reasonable terms.110 This type of implicit motivation might go far to solve 
the problem of restrictive licensing practices by some U.S. gene patent 
holders.   
To the rare extent that compulsory patent licensing provisions are 
actually invoked by applicants for a license, the involvement of government 
bureaucracy is triggered to determine whether to grant a license, and if so, 
what its terms should be. The machinery of compulsory licensing 
disadvantageously displaces bargaining from the marketplace, creates 
potential delays, requires that the patentee be given due process rights to 
challenge the government’s compulsory licensing decision and terms, and 
so on. 
Another alternative (really just a variant of compulsory licensing) is 
called a “license of right” scheme.111 Certain categories of patents, to be 
 
Yosick, supra note 87, at 1277, 1284 (discussing the U.S.’s hostility towards compulsory 
licensing). 
 107. See, e.g., German Patent Law Act §§ 81–85 (1980), amended by the laws of July 16 and 
August 6, 1998 (providing for compulsory license proceedings), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text_pdf.jsp?lang=EN&id=1035 (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). See also 
Yosick, supra note 87, at 1277, 1284 (discussing the U.S.’s hostility towards compulsory 
licensing). 
 108. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting that 
“[c]ompulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system”); Samuel Mark Borowski, Saving 
Tomorrow from Today: Preserving Innovation in the Face of Compulsory Licensing, 36 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 275, 282 (Winter 2009). 
 109. See Borowski, supra note 108, at 300 n.187 (noting that the value of compulsory licenses 
is “the inducement of the patentee to agree to reasonable terms”).   
 110. Id.; Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 781 (2010) 
(noting the success of South Africa and Brazil in reducing prices charged by pharmaceutical 
companies on drugs under patent by using the threat of compulsory licensing); Kimberly M. 
Thomas, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a Compulsory Licensing 
Provision in Wake of an Absent Experimental Use Exception, 7 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 97, 108 
(2007) (discussing instances where inventors threatened with compulsory licensing have come to 
agreements with patent holders to avoid litigation). 
 111. For example, India’s patent laws formerly incorporated a “license of right” for all process 
patents pertaining to substances capable of being used as medicines or foods.  See The Patents 
Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE § 87 (1970) (titled “Certain patents deemed to be endorsed with 
the words ‘Licenses of right,’”), available at http://indiacode nic.in.  The United Kingdom’s patent 
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determined by the legislature (such as gene patents), would automatically 
be made available for licensing to all comers for a pre-set statutory royalty 
rate (that is, some percentage or per-unit amount of the sales made by for-
profit testing facilities that provide genetic testing using a patented 
gene).112 The concept is not very different from the mechanical license in 
copyright law, which the U.S. has recognized for years to benefit musical 
work copyright holders.113 Postponing the implementation of a license of 
right scheme until a few years of exclusivity have elapsed, rather than 
immediately after a gene patent issues, would enhance patentee incentives 
and be consistent with Paris Convention principles.114 
Lastly, courts can act to facilitate patient access to patented genetic 
testing materials even if Congress chooses not to. In the post-eBay 
landscape we now inhabit,115 mandated licensing for a limited category of 
uses of patented genes should no longer shock or inflame the patent-owning 
community. Although it seemed virtually impossible ten years ago, U.S. 
courts in 2010 are denying permanent injunctions against adjudicated 
infringers and permitting them to continue infringing uses, manufacturing, 
and sales, in exchange for payment of “ongoing royalties.”116 If courts can 
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 112. See Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use 
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 114. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5.A.(4), opened for 
signature Mar. 20, 1883, as amended Sept. 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/export 
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fashion such remedies in cases of infringed patents covering, e.g., 
automotive technology,117 then it is all the more appropriate that they 
consider doing so in cases involving public health and welfare. The 
message of eBay is that patent rights, like other types of property rights, can 
no longer be understood to convey an absolute right to exclude others.   
 
royalty); id. at 1314 (observing that awarding an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction may be 
appropriate under some circumstances, including patent infringement). 
 117. See id. at 1315. 
